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THEORIZING AMERICAN FREEDOM
Anthony O'Rourke*

Two FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM. By Aziz Rana. Cambridge
and London: Harvard University Press. 2010. Pp. 415. $29.95.

THE

INTRODUCTION

Some intellectual concepts once central to America's constitutional discourse are, for better and worse, no longer part of our political language.'
These concepts may be so alien to us that they would remain invisible without carefully reexamining the past to challenge the received narratives of
America's constitutional development. 2 Should constitutional theorists undertake this kind of historical reexamination? If so, to what extent should
they be willing to stray from the disciplinary norms that govern intellectual
history? And what normative aims can they reasonably expect to achieve by
exploring ideas in our past that are no longer reflected in the Constitution's
text, structure, or interpretive doctrine? Aziz Rana's The Two Faces of American Freedom3 provides an occasion not only for reflecting on these
questions, but also for exploring how deeply they are interrelated.
Rana's project is a "large-scale ... historical reconstruction" of the relationship between ideas of freedom and exercises of foreign power in
American constitutional history (p. 2). This reconstruction draws upon settler colonial studies, a burgeoning interdisciplinary field that previously
received little attention from constitutional theorists, to examine the extent
to which the early American idea of freedom was predicated on a policy of
territorial expansion and elimination of indigenous populations.4 "[M]ost of
the American experience," Rana provocatively contends, "is best understood
as constitutional and political experiment in . . . settler empire" (p. 3). More
specifically, Rana argues that a robust but racially exclusionary idea of freedom predicated on whiteness-a concept he calls "settler freedom"-gave
rise to a constitutional structure that allowed for aggressive territorial expansion and domination of "outsider" groups, while offering a guarantee of
self-rule and political participation to Anglo-American "insiders." This
*
Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School.
For helpful suggestions and comments, thanks to Samuel Bray, Jessica Clarke, Mathilde Cohen, Erin Delaney, Henry Monaghan, Trevor Morrison, Tanusri Prasanna, Elizabeth Sepper,
Karen Tani, Charlotte Taylor, Christine Vamado, and participants at the Columbia Law School
Associates and Fellows Workshop.
1. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
3. Aziz Rana is an Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
4. See infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text; see also Lorenzo Veracini, Introducing Settler Colonial Studies, 1 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 1 (2011) (characterizing settler
colonial studies as a new scholarly field).
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concept of freedom, Rana contends, was ultimately eradicated from our
constitutional structure in the twentieth century, replaced by an understanding of liberty that was more inclusive, but in some ways far less substantive,
than its predecessor.5
If the scope of this historical argument is ambitious, so too are Rana's
normative aims. As Part I of this Review explains, the purpose of Rana's
historical narrative is not to present an exhaustive account of the multifarious ideas and ideologies that shaped America's constitutional development.
Instead, by recasting America's constitutional past through the lens of a single ideology, Rana hopes to uncover "normative tools for grappling with the
current moment and for imagining emancipatory alternatives" (p. 17). Unlike many historically informed works of constitutional theory, the success
of Rana's project does not necessarily turn on whether the narrative he presents is one historians would find persuasive.6
As Part II explains, however, it is unlikely that Rana's normative aims
can be fully achieved through the method of historical analysis he employs. Skeptical of what he calls the "abstract form of utopianism" that
characterizes work such as John Rawls's theory of justice,7 Rana contends
that the "American experience" can itself provide tools for imagining a more
economically protective, politically participatory vision of citizenship (pp.
17-19). This position, to my mind, reflects Rana's overconfidence that ideas
that are no longer part of our constitutional language may still constitute a
substantial part of our shared cultural experience, and suggests a misunderstanding of what Rana characterizes as "utopian" political theory.
Notwithstanding these concerns, Rana's methodology serves as a valuable complement to more analytical forms of political theorizing, and his
project is a significant contribution to constitutional scholarship. One of the
virtues of The Two Faces of American Freedom is Rana's willingness to take
intellectual risks, including the adoption of an unconventional historical
methodology, in order to present a socially relevant analysis than can inform
other theoretical projects. Indeed, as Part III suggests, Rana's project is most
normatively successful when it strays from the norms of intellectual history.
I. SETTLER FREEDOM AS A HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

According to Rana's account, the experience of Anglo-American colonists under British rule spawned a unique vision of freedom, predicated on
both territorial expansion and the subordination of outsiders (p. 12). This
vision, Rana argues, emerged from a tension between how "Anglo settlers"
conceived of their legal position within the British Empire and their status in
the eyes of the British Crown (pp. 21-22). As recent scholarship has emphasized, the concept of empire was hotly contested in pre-Revolutionary

5.

See infra Part I.

6.

See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
Pp. 17-18. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

7.
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America. 8 While agents of the British Crown thought of the legal structure
of their empire as "imperial and integrative," the Anglo-American elite espoused a "provincial and disintegrating" view. In this latter view, the
provinces that Anglo colonists inhabited were in some sense autonomous,
and those colonists were deserving of the same rights and liberties as Englishmen.9
As Rana describes it, the concept of freedom underpinning the AngloAmerican view was a populist incarnation of the civic republican idea of
freedom that historians have long held to be a formative principle of early
American constitutional thought. 0 A concept notorious for eluding precise
definition," republican freedom has both political and economic dimensions. The core of republican freedom, as Rana characterizes it, is freedom
from any possibility of being subjected to decisions in which one has not
participated on an equal basis with one's fellow citizens. 2 This freedom
requires that members of a political community enjoy a guarantee of selfrule and control over economic, political, and religious life (p. 54). Together,
these ideals entail a vision of citizenship in which members of a political
community are not only free as a formal matter to participate in politics but
also have the wealth necessary to avoid social control by more powerful
citizens. As originally envisioned by Anglo settlers, the only legitimate
means of obtaining this wealth was property ownership, since other forms of
resource accumulation either were corrupting (as with commerce) or degraded one's status as a member of the political community by subjecting
the person to another's will (as with wage earning) (pp. 53-55).
The political and economic dimensions of republican freedom, Rana argues, each generated a competing set of demands that together shaped
America's constitutional framework (p. 12). The principle of self-rule committed Americans to forming legal institutions that facilitated political

8. See John Fabian Witt, Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal Frame
(Will the Real British Empire Please Stand Up?), 120 HARV. L. REV. 754, 765-69 (2007)
(book review).
9.

DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFOR-

1664-1830, at 10, 84-86, 90-96
(2005); see also ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
7-10, 64-66 (2010) (arguing that the American idea of federalism emerged out of the colonial
elite's understanding of how power was allocated under the British imperial constitution).
MATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD,

10. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (4th prtg. 1969); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 83 (2d ed. 2003); GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1972) (1969).
11. See Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Careerof a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST.
11, 34 (1992) (describing the contested nature of "republicanism" as a concept in American
historiography).
12. P 51. This characterization is drawn from Quentin Skinner's account of "neoroman" liberty as the freedom from being subjected to "the will of anyone other than the
representatives of the body politic as a whole." See QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE
LIBERALISM 49 (1998).
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participation on the part of citizens and protected them against arbitrary applications of state power (pp. 53-54). This imperative called for a political
structure rooted in "local, decentralized legislative supremacy" and for firm
limits on government power over the citizenry (p. 124). To guarantee the
economic security necessary to make political participation meaningful,
however, institutions had to be structured to enable each citizen to acquire
the resources necessary to stand on an equal footing with his peers.1 3 Because land acquisition was the only morally salutary basis of acquiring
wealth, and was thus a precondition for republican freedom, the government
had to be organized around the principle of territorial conquest for the benefit of a privileged group of Anglo citizens. The result of these competing
institutional demands of decentralized government and territorial acquisition
was a "structural dualism" in America's constitutional order, characterized
by an executive with robust power over noncitizens in the realm of foreign
affairs, and rigid constraints on state authority over insiders (p. 167).
While Rana is not the first legal scholar to examine the link between republican freedom and imperial expansion in American constitutional
history, 4 he is the first to do so through the lens of settler colonial theory.
According to the scholars Rana draws upon from this field, "settler colonialism" differs from colonialism undertaken for military advantage or
economic trade.15 Under the latter forms of colonialism, imperial administrators have little intrinsic interest in land seizure and have an incentive to
"find and work through reliable indigenous partners or chartered companies."' 6 Settler societies, by contrast, are characterized by a permanent
"settler population" that is "intent on making a territory their permanent
home" while enjoying the living standards and political privileges of citizens in the metropole. 7 They are typically "bound[] by ties of ethnicity and
faith in what they persistently define[] as virgin or empty land," and tend to
develop relatively nonhierarchical modes of internal political authority."i
However, the settler project is organized around wresting land from
indigenous groups and eliminating them, "push[ing] them beyond an everexpanding frontier of settlement."' 9
By applying this theoretical framework, Rana offers a provocative and
original narrative of how early American ideas of freedom and imperialism
were interdependent, and together animated what was once a formative ide13. I use the masculine pronoun advisedly, since republican citizenship was a status
available only to men. See pp. 259-61; see also Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism
Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1669 (1988) (arguing that "patriarchy was embedded in classical
republicanism").
14.
15.

See, e.g., PococK, supra note 10, at 534-35.
Caroline Elkins & Susan Pedersen, Settler Colonialism:A Concept and Its Uses, in
SETTLER COLONIALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: PROJECTS, PRACTICES, LEGACIES 1, 2
(Caroline Elkins & Susan Pederson eds., 2005).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
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ology underpinning American constitutional governance. According to Rana, this "settler ideology" had four basic components. 2° First, inspired by a
radical idea of republican freedom, settlers sought to create an "internally
egalitarian and participatory political community" predicated on land ownership and individual proprietorship (p. 12). Second, the "basic engine" of
this internally egalitarian ideal was territorial conquest, such that republican
freedom was "constitutively bound to empire and expansion" (p. 12). Third,
the economic preconditions of republican freedom meant that it was not
universally inclusive, because it required Americans to expropriate native land
and consign certain classes of individuals to degraded forms of labor (p. 12).
Americans thus drew a distinction between "free citizens"-men for whom
republican freedom could be fully realized-and subordinated, external
groups.2 Fourth, the promise of free citizenship, while completely foreclosed
for nonwhites and women, was remarkably open for European immigrants
who could be assimilated into the ethnic identity of American settlers. European newcomers benefited not only from a remarkably open immigration
regime but also from policies such as grants of voting rights to noncitizens
and access to federal land in the territories (pp. 115-20). This openness ensured that America's population of "free citizens" grew at a rate that made it
possible to preserve the structure of settler society (pp. 15, 120).
The Two Faces of American Freedom recasts a considerable amount of
republican historiography through this theoretical lens and, by doing so,
reveals a little-explored link between American external power and domestic freedom. Rana argues, for example, that a constitution that
facilitated territorial conquest served to sustain what other scholars have
characterized as a "free labor" ideology, according to which the ownership
of economically productive property could enable independent laborers
(including artisans and petty entrepreneurs) to participate on an equal basis
as citizens in a political community.2 This ideology conceptually severed
the promise of republican freedom from the requirement of land ownership,
20. Rana does not define what he means by "ideology." His use of the term, however, is
consistent with Clifford Geertz's influential definition of it as a set of concepts that have the
structural purpose of motivating political action. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Ideology as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 193, 218 (1973) ("The function of ideology
is to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render
it meaningful, the suasive images by means of which it can be sensibly grasped.").
21.
P. 115. Here, Rana is treating citizenship as "an ahistorical or theoretical category
that can serve as a baseline for cross-temporal comparison." Sam Erman, Book Note, An "Unintended Consequence":Dred Scott Reinterpreted, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1157, 1161 n.25 (2008)
(reviewing AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1837-1857 (2006)). This category is entirely distinct from "citizenship" as a legal status, which Rana refers to as "formal citizenship." As Erman explains,
this methodological decision can allow scholars to "recover less-studied historical concepts of
citizenship that resemble concepts that exist today," albeit at the cost of understating "the
extent to which citizenship was a slippery term, varying across locales, occasioning disputes,
and shifting shape over time." Id.
22. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

(1995).
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thus broadening the class of individuals for whom full and free citizenship
was possible. Thus, Rana argues, the settler ideology continued to undergird
America's constitutional structure through the nineteenth century.
By the 1890s, however, America's political and economic development
placed "profound pressure" on the material conditions that made settler
freedom possible.2 3 The most serious threat to the settler ideal, as Rana envisions it, was the closing of the frontier, which threatened the promise of
widespread economic independence through land ownership and eliminated
the need for a massive influx of immigrants who could be assimilated into
settler society.24 In conjunction with the end of America's territorial expansion on the continent, the rise of railroad transportation consolidated
national manufacturing markets and ensured that corporations played a
heavy role in the politics of frontier communities, further diminishing the
hope that settlers could rely on land acquisition and control of subordinated
populations to create an internally egalitarian society (p. 185). Although the
United States continued its project of territorial expansion, it did so through
were not constructed as "uninhabitthe occupation of island territories that
25
ed" land primed for white settlement.
Rana argues that these developments gave rise to a constitutional jurisprudence that undermined the "great premise" of settler colonialism-that
"U.S. expansion went hand in hand with decentralized and autonomous selfrule of free citizens" (p. 280). In the area of foreign affairs, the Supreme
Court created a new framework for addressing the legal status of the island
territories (Guam, Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico). Specifically, in
the Insular Cases,26 the Court demarcated these overseas possessions as
"unincorporated territories" that were not integral to the United States and
could be "held indefinitely as colonial dependencies" or relinquished as
Congress saw fit. 27 In the domestic realm, the Court increased the president's power to respond to incidents of domestic unrest, including the labor

23. Pp. 174-75. While Rana's book contains a detailed and compelling discussion of
how the events that led to the American Civil War reflected a settler vision of American power,
it offers little analysis of how the Civil War itself affected America's commitment to a settler
ideology. Cf ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 97-108
(1980). "During the Reconstruction the coalition which had fought the Civil War dissolved
into its components, and strands of free labor ideology were adopted by contending social
classes, each for its own purposes." Id. at 126.
24. Seep. 174.
25. Cf Elkins & Pedersen, supra note 15, at 2 (describing "settler colonialism" as having occurred when settlers "sought to construct communities bounded by ties of ethnicity and
faith in what they persistently defined as virgin or empty land").
26. The Insular Cases refer to a group of cases from 1901 to 1922, including Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), which is the focus of much of Rana's analysis, and Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
27. Pp. 275-81; cf Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and
TerritorialDeannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 797 (2005) (arguing that the constitutional
innovation of the Insular Cases was that they "installed a doctrine of territorial deannexation
in American constitutional jurisprudence").
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disruptions that grew in tandem with corporate expansion.2" Thus the "structural dualism" between the Executive's strength in foreign affairs and its
weakness in domestic affairs began to unravel (pp. 225-26).
But, Rana argues, this unraveling was slow at first, and the settler ideal
continued to inspire political actors who otherwise had vastly divergent
ideologies. On one side, there was the Supreme Court, which had not yet
completely come to grips with the economic transformations that threatened the settler concept of freedom. For example, in Rana's account, a free
labor ideology can explain the Court's approach to economic regulation in
both Lochner v. New York, 29 where it struck down a statute limiting the
workday of bakers, and Muller v. Oregon,3" where it upheld a statute limiting the workday of women. In Lochner, Justice Peckham characterized the
bakers whom the statute regulated (who were, in reality, wage laborers subjected to dangerous and degrading working conditions) as artisans and
individual proprietors-free citizens whose right to self-rule entitled them to
"care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state, interfering with
their independence of judgment and of action."'" Women, by contrast, were
a subordinate class of citizens within the settler-republican framework, and
could be consigned to labor that was degrading and unmeaningful for free
citizens. Because work could not provide women with the autonomy necessary to participate as full members of the political community, the Court in
Muller saw it appropriate to regulate women's labor through legislation that
32
was "not necessary for men.
On the opposite side of the ideological contest, some radical political
figures constructed new visions of republican freedom by drawing on settler
concepts while rejecting the racial and gender hierarchies of the settler
structure. The Knights of Labor's Thomas Powderly, for example, forged
alliances with radical Populists in the Farmer's Alliance and advocated for a
producer-centered society in which all laborers, regardless of race or color,
had the capacity for self-rule. Subsequently, John Dewey invoked a republican idea of civic and political participation to argue for a restructuring of the
economic relations and divisions of labor in society.33 In the "Great Community" that Dewey envisioned, each individual would have "a responsible
share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the
groups to which [the person] belongs," including industrial organizations,
and would "participat[e] according to the need in the values which the

28. Pp. 222-26; see In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1890) (upholding the attorney
general's authority to assign U.S. marshals to protect federal judges); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895) (upholding the president's decision to enjoin the 1894 American Railway Union strike
and to enforce the injunction by deploying federal troops).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

198 U.S. 45,57 (1905).
208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908).
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57; see pp. 231-32.
Muller, 208 U.S. at 422-23; see pp. 322-23.
See p. 248; JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 147-48 (1927).
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This vision reflected a keen awareness of America's political and economic structure, but took seriously the idea that, through a
"practical re-formation of social conditions," individuals could structure
their working and political relationships based on the principles of self-rule
and community engagement."
But, Rana argues, these efforts to craft a more capacious, post-settler
understanding of freedom failed to gain traction in political discourse. By
the 1930s, the expansion of executive power in both domestic and foreign
affairs had given rise to a "new mode of politics" that completely supplanted
the earlier settler ideal. A conception of rights developed that was far more
inclusive than the settler understanding, extending (as Dewey and other
radical thinkers had hoped it would) "to outsiders long subordinated under
the settler narrative" (p. 295). However, with this expansion of membership in the American political community came a decline in the value of
that membership. Where citizenship had been predicated on "economic
independence," it now involved only a guarantee of "security from economic want" through federal programs that failed to offer individuals any
meaningful control over their livelihoods (pp. 262, 296). Where citizenship once involved a robust idea of political self-rule, it was now reduced
to an emphasis on electoral choice-in which voters were free to decide
upon their leaders but conditioned to leave the complicated work of governance and political decisionmaking to a professional elite.3 6 Finally,
where the settler idea of free citizenship required a foreign policy of territorial expansion for the sake of colonization, the principal goal of foreign
policy was now "global primacy" and "pacification" (p. 296). Thus, Rana
argues, the settler concept of freedom had, for better and for worse, been
eradicated from our governing constitutional framework.
groups sustain.

The broad sweep of this narrative tempts a question often asked of historically grounded constitutional theory: Is the methodology one that

34.

P. 248; DEWEY, supra note 33, at 147.

35. Pp. 248-49; DEWEY, supra note 33, at 211.
36. Pp. 296, 306-08. Rana arguably overstates the extent to which the New Deal vision
of electoral politics differs from the republican idea of self-rule. According to Quentin Skinner's account of eighteenth-century republican freedom (an account that Rana borrows), "the
will of the people" meant nothing more mysterious than "the sum of the wills of each individual citizen," as mediated by "an assembly chosen by the people to legislate on their behalf."
SKINNER, supra note 12, at 28-29, 32. Moreover, not every citizen had the moral capacity to
serve as a representative. Rather, the legislators needed to be "the more virtuous and considering" of the citizenry. Id. at 32. For those citizens who lacked the special virtue required of a
legislator, it was sufficient from the standpoint of republican freedom that they had the opportunity to choose who represented them. This concept of political participation plainly does not
require, and indeed seems to be at odds with, "participatory control over all the relevant sites
of decision making." P. 288.
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historians would accept?37 No, Rana refreshingly concedes. While The Two
Faces of American Freedom offers a historical account of the relationship
between national power and domestic freedom, Rana cautions that it is "not
a work of traditional historical scholarship" (p. 17). It is, instead, a selfconsciously normative and presentist project "in which history is presented
in the service of today's problems as well as tomorrow's latent possibilities"
(p. 17). This presentation is largely univocal: rather than attempt to chart the
diversity of ideologies and of political languages that influenced American
constitutionalism, as an intellectual historian might, Rana reexamines America's constitutional development exclusively through the lens of one of these
ideologies. By offering this new and stylized narrative of America's constitutional history, Rana aims to provide a "means for critiquing the
institutions and concepts that have dominated contemporary thinking"
(pp. 18-19).
For many constitutional theorists, acknowledging that historians would
not accept their historical account would be tantamount to admitting failure.
Rana's project differs, however, from most historically oriented legal scholarship. In keeping with this scholarship, Rana strives to present a credible
account of the past to influence how we think about present-day constitutional problems. But while the success of Rana's normative project is to
some extent related to the credibility of his historical narrative, this relation
is less direct, and more complex, than is typical for historically grounded
legal theorizing. Though Rana's narrative is undoubtedly incomplete and
ideologically selective, he-unlike many theorists--does not employ it in
order to legitimize a particular constitutional vision.3 8 Nor is Rana an unequivocal booster for the settler ideology that he excavates, which is at its
core a racial ideology that nobody would care to revive. Instead, he uses
history to draw out ideas and concepts that could help shed light on contemporary constitutional questions, but which do not dictate definitive answers
to those questions. Such a project does not necessarily suffer-or, at least,
suffers far less than most historically grounded legal theory-from the fact
that it departs from historians' methodological standards. (Indeed, as Part III
of this Review suggests, Rana's normative goals would have been better
served by departing even more dramatically from those standards.)
Therefore, the success or failure of Rana's project should, in my view,
be judged primarily on whether it advances its broad normative aims, rather
than on whether it strictly conforms to the disciplinary conventions of historians.39 By this standard, The Two Faces of American Freedom is a
37.

Cf Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1749

(1996) ("Legal arguments relying on economics, philosophy, or sociology are more convincing when they comport with the standards set by those disciplines. Nothing prevents the same
point from applying to arguments based upon history.").
38.

Cf Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV.

551, 567-80 (2006) (criticizing Antonin Scalia's characterization of the common law as a
coherent and unified field at the time of the Constitution's framing).
39. See Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 114-19 (1997) (offering a partial defense of "lawyers'
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significant theoretical accomplishment. It successfully taps the insights of a
discipline unfamiliar to many legal scholars, and by doing so offers a novel
interpretation of America's constitutional past. This interpretation suggests
new and challenging ways of thinking about the relationship between national power and domestic freedom-a theoretical achievement that a more
nuanced, but less provocative, historical account could not necessarily obtain.
1I.

THEORIZING FREEDOM: HISTORICAL VALUES
AND "ABSTRACT UTOPIANISM"

This is not to say, however, that Rana's normative aims do not themselves merit scrutiny, or that his methodological choices are ideal for
achieving those aims. Indeed, the scope of Rana's normative ambitions raises significant questions about the value, and limits, of examining political
ideals that were once, but no longer are, integral to a constitutional culture.
Rana presents his method of historical inquiry as a full-service alternative to abstract and "utopian" philosophical "ruminations" about justice
(p. 18). Using John Rawls's theory of justice4 ' as a stalking horse, Rana asserts that such "highly analytical forms of theorizing ... only reinforce the
seeming gulf between governing institutions and utopian ideals" (pp. 1718). Granted, "this form of utopian thinking embodies one avenue of social
creativity," but it is not the sort of "creativity" that can do much to change
things, for it "never attaches the promise of improvement to a vision of practical agency" (p. 18). Moreover, such "utopian" theorizing "fails to suggest
the cultural tools within the American experience that make these accounts
of justice not just universal aspirations but rather constitutive elements of
our local and contested debates over social possibility."4 By contrast, the
settler concepts of freedom and social membership, for all their warts, are
things we can accept as "foundational aspects of our identity" and as part of
"our own practices and ideas" (p. 18; first emphasis added). Therefore, Rana contends, identifying these concepts provides us with a "means for
critiquing the institutions and concepts that have dominated contemporary
thinking" that "utopian" theory is unable to offer (p. 19).

legal history" written to generate "interpretations that are of use in resolving modem legal
controversies" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Usable
Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 605 (1995) (defending the use in constitutional law of "arguments and political/legal narratives that place a (stylized) past and present into a trajectory
leading to a desired future").
40. See RAWLS, supra note 7.
41. P. 18. With this statement, Rana dismisses not only "utopian" political theory but
also scholarship exploring the application of such theory to our actual governing institutions.
See generally Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973) (discussing the implications of
Rawls's theory for creating a welfare-oriented constitutionalism); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of
Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, Il1 YALE L.J. 399 (2001) (analyzing how Rawls's
concept of a "veil of ignorance" is instantiated in constitutional law).
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There is an interesting irony in Rana's dismissal of "utopian" theory's
practical possibilities. The Two Faces of American Freedom is, ultimately,
about an American populist ideology that emerged out of republican political theory. At the time of the American Revolution, republican theorists
were attacked for the same sort of utopianism that Rana condemns.4 2 For
example, in what became a leading nineteenth-century textbook on political
theory, William Paley urged that republican definitions of liberty "ought to
be rejected" because they were "unattainable in experience" and served only
to "inflame expectations that can never be gratified."43 Thus, Rana's project
not only takes part in a long tradition of dismissing political theories for
being utopian, but also undermines that tradition by showing its potential to
motivate political action."
Irony aside, one can question whether Rana's methodology is markedly
superior to "utopian" theorizing in terms of offering a vision of freedom
rooted in our cultural experience. First, it is unclear how recovering antiquated concepts of freedom and citizenship-concepts predicated on racial
subordination and the elimination of native populations-enables us to accept those concepts as "foundational aspects of our identity," and as a part
of "our own practices and ideas" (p. 18; first emphasis added). If Rana is
correct that these concepts are no longer part of our constitutional language,
how are they any more a part of our practices and identity than other concepts that our forebearers had but that are now alien to us?
One obvious answer is that rediscovering how the Constitution was originally understood is relevant to how judges, lawyers, and scholars resolve
current constitutional questions.4 5 But this does not get us far with respect to
concepts as abstract and legally indeterminate as "freedom." Nor does the
historical understanding of a concept have legal weight when aspects of that
understanding (such as the principle of racial subordination intrinsic to the
settler concept of freedom) are both morally odious and intolerable as a matter of present-day constitutional text, structure, and precedent.46 Moreover, if
Rana were arguing for the legitimacy of a particular constitutional interpretation based on the original understanding of the Constitution, his argument
42. These theorists included James Harrington, whose Commonwealth of Oceana lays
out the constitutional structure of a utopian version of England, and whom Rana identifies as
one of the core influences on the settler ideology. See JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (1656) (describing the constitutional structure of an idealized England).
43. WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 341 (7th
ed. 1785); see also SKINNER, supra note 12, at 78 (discussing Paley's attack on neo-roman

utopianism).
44. See Martha Nussbaum, Response, Still Worthy of Praise, It1 HARV. L. REV. 1776,
1780 (1998) (offering examples of philosophical ideas that have influenced public life).
45. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 9-24 (1982) (analyzing a variety of
arguments referencing the Framers' understanding of the Constitution and categorizing them
as historical, doctrinal, structural, and ethical types of constitutional advocacy).
46. See id.; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987) (arguing that most judges and lawyers recognize the legitimacy of constitutional arguments based on text, historical
understanding, structure, precedent, and contemporary values).
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would require a much more traditional work of historical scholarship than
he purports to offer.

47

What Rana seems to suggest is that some sort of affective identification
with our past allows us to recognize as foundational to our identity those
concepts our forebearers possessed. These concepts, the argument goes, are
meaningful to us simply because they are part of our history. It is unclear,
however, how we can identify with a concept that is alien to our constitutional language, or with the people who espoused that concept. As
illustrated by Rana's account of how the concept of freedom evolved, significant discontinuities exist between our political language and that of our
predecessors. 48 Even when we are using the same word as earlier political
writers and thinkers, we may be using it in different ways, to address entirely different problems, under entirely different economic and social
circumstances. 49 If one can identify continuities between our constitutional
language and that of our predecessors, or between the problems and circumstances that have shaped our respective constitutional understandings, it may
indeed be possible to show how a concept they used is reflected in "our own
practices and ideas."5 Absent any such continuity, however, it is difficult to
understand what might create a link across the "vast abyss of cultural es-

trangement,"'" to borrow a phrase from literary theory, that time creates
between our constitutional values and those of preceding generations.

Moreover, in rejecting the "highly analytical forms of theorizing evident
in political philosophy" (p. 17), Rana fails to appreciate how deeply socially
rooted-perhaps problematically so-much of this literature is. There are
few better examples of this than Rawls's work. In broad summary, Rawls
proposes a process of "reflective equilibrium" for identifying the principles
of justice that would be accepted by a "well-ordered society," one whose
52
members are committed to acting justly and upholding just institutions.
The first step is to identify which principles of justice a member of the soci47.

See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.

48.

Cf ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 2 (Univ. of Notre Dame
Press 1998) (1966) ("There are continuities as well as breaks in the histories of moral concepts. Just here lies the complexity of the history.").
49. 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS 86 (2002) (arguing that political thinkers from different historical periods use common terms, "if at all, only in such divergent ways
that it seems an obvious confusion to suppose that any stable concepts are being picked out");
see also J.G.A. Pocock, PoliticalIdeas as HistoricalEvents: PoliticalPhilosophers as Historical Actors, in POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 139 (Melvin Richter ed.,
1980), reprinted in J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 51, 59 (2009) ("[A]ny
linguistic relation between two persons can be thought of as a historical relation, and the fact
that the historical distance between them may be as great as two and a half millienia only
serves to highlight the problems of historicity which the relationship involves.").
50. P. 18; see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS 7 (2002)
(arguing that "constitutional law is thoroughly historical, dependent throughout on the contingencies of time and political circumstance, and that it is a coherent tradition of argument").
51.
Cf Stephen Greenblatt, The Eating of the Soul, 48 REPRESENTATIONS 97, 99
(1994).
52.

RAWLS,

supra note 7, at 8, 453-54.
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ety would agree upon in the "original position," a situation in which each
member is behind a "veil of ignorance," without information that might distort decisionmaking processes such as his or her particular natural abilities,
social status, intelligence, and psychological propensities." By design, this
framework is, as Rana charges, "severely disconnected" from the reality of
everyday political life.54 The second step in the process, however, involves
stepping back to evaluate whether the principles arrived at in the original
position match our considered convictions about justice-convictions like
our belief that racial discrimination is unjust. 5" If the principles conflict with
our considered convictions, then we must either modify our account of the
original position and derive a new set of principles, or reevaluate our considered judgments to determine
whether they reflect distortions or biases of
56
which we had been unaware.
Thus, Rawls's framework both incorporates a society's prevailing moral
sentiments and provides a means for critiquing those sentiments. This method of theorizing places Rawls (and other "highly analytical" political
philosophers) within a long tradition of so-called "utopian" political theory57 -a tradition that Rana draws upon in fleshing out the settler concept of
freedom. These theories take seriously the principles that a society purports
to value and construct a political ideal that reflects those principles, thereby
highlighting the ways in which our actual social practices are out of step
with how we conceive of ourselves.58 Rana, then, appears to underestimate
the extent to which "utopian" theory strives to articulate principles that we
can accept as "foundational aspects of our identity," and as a part of "our
own practices and ideas" (p. 18).
Unlike these theorists, Rana offers a complicated historical idea of freedom, many aspects of which are incompatible with our considered
convictions about justice. It is unclear why this concept is more foundational
to our identity than one obtained through the process of reflective equilibrium. If an analytically minded philosopher were to construct a "theory of
freedom," it might be one that we would accept in theory and aspire to accept in practice. By contrast, the historical concept that Rana offers, in
which the privileges of freedom are tied to whiteness, is one we would reject
in theory and aspire to reject in practice. Moreover, while the philosopher
would work within our present-day constitutional language, Rana presents a
53. Id. at 11.
54. P. 18. However, it is at the very least an open question whether Rawls's vision of a
well-ordered society is properly characterized as "utopian." See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Dignity
and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1622 (2010) ("Rawls's
[well-ordered] society is not utopian in that fantasy sense; it is steadfastly located in the circumstances of justice, which include among other things the subjective circumstances of
anxiety and limited strength of will among its citizens.").
55.

RAWLS, supra note 7, at 48.

56. Id.
57. See SKINNER, supra note 12, at 79 n.47 (identifying A Theory of Justice as "a utopian treatise... and none the worse for that").
58.

See id. at 79.
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historical concept alien to that language. Such a concept seems far more
"severely disconnected" from our everyday lives than one that a "utopian"
philosopher could derive (p. 18).
This is not to suggest, however, that Rana's methodology lacks normative promise. In my view, Rana's methodology is not an adequate substitute
for more systematic philosophical theorizing, but it is a necessary complement. Analytical political philosophy, at least under a reflective equilibrium
model, is predicated on an author's assessment of what a society believes to
be its considered convictions. If these convictions are not interrogated, they
can distort the process of developing a more analytically refined understanding of value-laden concepts like freedom and justice. Indeed, some have
argued that such distortions infect Rawls's analysis, and that his theory is
too parasitic on unexamined moral intuitions to count as more than an apology for our existing social arrangements.5 9 Insofar as it is possible to
rehabilitate Rawls's framework in the face of these powerful criticisms, it
requires complementary methods of critiquing our considered convictions
before using them as the building blocks of a systematic theory. Responsible
political philosophy thus requires engagement with the social sciences and
whatever other disciplines might enable us to, as Bernard Williams puts it,
"reflexively rais[e] questions" about a theory's "relations to social reality."6
As Rana's project illustrates, historically grounded theory can help us
call our convictions into question. It makes clear that the way we currently
think about ideas such as freedom is not the only way of thinking about
them.6' Even intellectual historians who stress the impossibility of understanding texts outside their historical contexts recognize that examining the
past can allow us to "stand back from the intellectual commitments we have
inherited and ask ourselves in a new spirit of enquiry what we should think
of them."62 While it may be unwise to rely on the past for political ideas that
59. See Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against "Nonsense" Jurisprudence),
100 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Mar. 2012) (discussing the reflective equilibrium model's "inherent conservatism"); see also RAYMOND GEuss, Liberalism and Its Discontents, in OUTSIDE
ETHICS 11,22 (2005) ("It is ...extremely striking, not to say astounding, to the lay reader
that the complex theoretical apparatus of Theory of Justice, operating through over 500 pages
of densely argued text, eventuates in a constitutional structure that is a virtual replica (with
some extremely minor deviations) of the arrangements that exist in the United States."); R.M.
HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT 12 (1981) (arguing that the "equilibrium" reached under Rawls's method "is one between forces which might have been
generated by prejudice").
60. BERNARD WILLIAMS, Political Philosophy and the Analytical Tradition (1980),
reprintedin PHILOSOPHY AS A HUMANISTIC DISCIPLINE 155, 159 (A. W. Moore ed., 2006).
61. SKINNER, supra note 12, at 116 ("As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them
bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking
about them.").
62. 1 SKINNER, supra note 49, at 6; see also JOHN DUNN, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 1 (1996) (arguing that even "quite archaic intellectual resources
can help us to improve our judgment of the significance of recent political experience, and
perhaps even (thereby) our prospects for securing a better rather than a worse political future
for ourselves and our descendants").
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are fundamental to our social identity-we'll need to work out those ideas
for ourselves-we can use the past to challenge our current ideas in ways
that more abstract theorizing may not allow. Rana is thus correct that his
theoretical approach can offer a "means for critiquing the institutions and
concepts that have dominated contemporary thinking" (p. 19). In this respect, Rana's project is a success.
III. SETTLER FREEDOM AS NORMATIVE THEORY

It is worth exploring, however, whether Rana's methodological choices
enable him to fully realize the normative promise of his account of settler
freedom. The historical and normative aspects of Rana's project-orienting
American constitutional history around a concept of settler freedom and
creating a narrative that sheds light on current constitutional problems-give
rise to two competing methodological pressures. On one hand, in order to
present a responsible intellectual history of how a concept has influenced
American constitutional discourse, it is necessary to define the concept with
enough specificity to make it possible to evaluate the concept's importance
in the political climate of a given period. 63 The concept must, in other
words, be treated as stable, or rigid, in order to accurately identify when it is
deployed in specific texts and to determine whether the concept has fallen
into disuse. 64 On the other hand, for the sake of constructing a historical
narrative that can be used "in the service of today's problems" (p. 17), it
might be tempting to discard this methodological requirement and treat the
concept as fluid. That is, it may be worth treating the concept's meaning as
something that evolves over time in ways that make it relevant to contemporary constitutional or political questions.
Rana appears to tacitly alternate between these two incompatible methodologies in tracing how the concept of settler freedom has shaped
American constitutionalism. Specifically, Rana treats the concept as fluid
and adaptive for much of the book, but as too rigid and static to adapt to the
pressures of the New Deal. This tension in his analysis provides an interesting case study on the relative merits of two methods of using historical
concepts to shed light on contemporary problems. Perhaps surprisingly,
this Review suggests, the less acceptable one from an intellectual history
standpoint is, in this case, the more successful one from a normative
standpoint-an irony that raises interesting questions about the role of
historical argument in normative theory.
63. See 1 SKINNER, supra note 49, at 62-63, 85-86 (criticizing the "unit-idea" approach to intellectual history, in which the "morphology" of a given doctrine is traced through
all the historical periods through which it appears); see also Anthony Grafton, History of Ideas: Precepts and Practice, 1950-2000 and Beyond, 67 J. HIST. IDEAS 1, 6 (2006) (observing
that contemporary "[s]cholars who mention the name of A.O. Lovejoy," the creator of the
"unit-idea" approach, "do so in order to in order to lampoon his methods").
64. See POCOCK, supra note 49, at 13 (explaining that historians of thought are interested in examining how "relatively stable concepts" are "employed in the political thought of
relatively stable societies").
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The settler freedom that Rana traces through the nineteenth century
appears to be a fluid concept, one that evolved in response to cultural and
economic changes following the United States' founding. In the book's
early chapters, Rana's characterization of settler freedom is, for the most
65
part, in keeping with other theorists' definitions of republican freedom.
Under each of these definitions, the freedom requires actual independence
from the very possibility of being arbitrarily subjected to another's will; in
other words, you are deprived of your liberty if you are actually coerced by
the state (or another citizen), but also if your material conditions leave you
at the mercy of the state (or another citizen) to avoid coercing you out of
grace or benevolence. 66 This form of freedom requires that each citizen have
actualeconomic independence from his fellow citizens.
Given this economic imperative, it would be difficult for a republican
freedom to sustain a popular ideology-as in a set of concepts and ideas that
motivates political action 6 7-in a democracy where a large majority of the
electorate did not own real property. This more or less described the United
States by the 1870s. By this period in the country's history, the property and
taxpaying qualifications for voting that were common in antebellum America had largely been abolished for white males, 68 and most working people
were wage laborers who owned no productive property.69 Indeed, the republican historians whom Rana relies upon largely acknowledge that civic
republicanism had ceased to exist by this period as a meaningful ideology in
American politics.7" For Rana, however, the settler ideology survived as an
influence in politics and jurisprudence."1
How, then, did the settler ideology continue to underpin America's constitutional structure? The answer implicit in Rana's analysis is that the
concept of settler freedom evolved to accommodate changes in America's
political economy and social order. By the mid-nineteenth century, Rana
contends, the free market "appeared to exacerbate economic and bargaining
inequalities between employers and laborers rather than promote broadbased self rule," and the language of Jacksonian populism did not offer a
means of critiquing these structural inequalities (p. 152). In such a society,
those who were reduced to working as wage laborers could not participate
65. Specifically, Rana's characterization is adapted from Quentin Skinner's definition
of neo-roman liberty. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. It also draws from Philip
Pettit's definition of liberty as nondomination. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANIsM: A THEORY
OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT

52 (1997).

66.

SKINNER, supra note 12, at 68-70.

67.

See supra note 20.

68.

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOC-

RACY IN THE UNITED STATES

24-26 (rev. ed. 2009).

69. William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the
Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 767, 779.
70. Rodgers, supra note 11, at 29-30 (noting general scholarly consensus among nineteenth century historians that republicanism had been "killed dead by the Civil War").
71. See, e.g., pp. 227-28 (discussing how the settler ideology animated Justice Field's
dissent in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 93 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting)).
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in the settler ideal as it existed in the nineteenth century. The settler ideology
was sustained, however, by the continued existence of the frontier, which
provided wage laborers with the promise of land ownership. If confronted
with conditions of economic dependence, poor settlers could escape to the
frontier, where land (and hence the promise of economic and political independence) was widely available (p. 152). This promise gave poor settlers an
investment in a constitutional order that supported territorial expansion, regardless of whether the settlers were themselves property owners.
Thus, the settler concept of freedom diverged, subtly but importantly,
from the republican concept of freedom from which it emerged. Where settler freedom initially meant actual independence from the threat of arbitrary
coercion, it grew to demand only the promise of independence in the event
that a citizen starts to bridle under his condition of servitude. This reconceived idea of freedom is incompatible with the republican theories that
Rana earlier relies upon.72 However, unlike the concept of freedom Rana
initially describes, this new ideal is one that appealed to settlers whose ethnicity qualified them for free citizenship, but who did not satisfy the
republican criteria for free citizenship.
This fluid treatment of the concept of settler freedom is, in my view, a
valuable methodological move. The central aim of The Two Faces of American Freedom is not to challenge or keep faith with a specific republican
historiography, but to demonstrate the ways in which American freedom-in
whatever form it may have taken-has been predicated on territorial expansion and racial subordination.73 By relying on a protean definition of settler
freedom when analyzing the nineteenth century, Rana is able to identify
these phenomena as part of America's constitutional structure long after a
static definition of republican freedom might otherwise allow. This flexibility allows him to provide an illustration of how intellectual concepts might
not only give rise to a particular constitutional structure but also evolve to
keep that structure in place. If tracing a settler ideology into the twentieth
century helps Rana identify a concept of freedom that was unfamiliar to
republican discourse, so much the better.
Moreover, treating the concept of settler freedom as fluid places Rana's
project in the mainstream of current theoretical work in settler colonial studies, allowing Rana to obtain as many insights as possible from a discipline
that he is introducing to legal scholarship. The theorists Rana draws upon
argue that settler colonization does not typically mark a discrete stage in a
nation's history. Settler colonization is "a structure rather than an event,"

72. A key psychological assumption of early modem republican political theory, according to Quentin Skinner, is that it is impossible for a citizen to think or act as his
conscience dictates if he is living in a condition of dependence. The very recognition that you
are in such a condition, according to eighteenth-century republican theorists, would "serve in
itself to constrain you from exercising a number of your civil rights" out of fear of provoking
your superior. SKINNER, supra note 12, at 84; see also id. at 85-93.
73. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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and its history does not stop with the closing of a nation's frontier.74 A settler colonial state is, as described above, one that is organized around a
project of eliminating native societies." At different historical junctures,
however, the state may adopt different and more sophisticated strategies of
elimination, such as assimilating the native group. 76 Accordingly, "[s]ettler
colonialism ... is not the past-a violent but thankfully brief period of conquest and domination-but
rather the foundational governing ethic of [a]
'new world' state."77 Therefore, according to these theorists, narrating the
history of a settler state "involves charting the continuities, discontinuities,
adjustments, and departures whereby a logic that initially informed frontier
killing transmutes into different modalities, discourses and institutional formations. 7 8 This view is not only consistent with treating the concepts
underlying a settler ideology as fluid; it seems to require it.

Notwithstanding these merits, Rana appears to revert to a static, nonevolving concept of settler freedom in arguing that the settler ideology was
unequipped to survive the political and economic changes wrought by the
1930s. Specifically, Rana argues that the New Deal's constitutional framework ensured that "the distinction between free citizen and stratified
subject-between republican self-rule and centralized despotism-that had
so galvanized early American settlers dissolved into thin air" (p. 324). Even
if Rana had consistently traced a fixed concept of settler freedom from the
eighteenth century through the beginning of the twentieth, this claim would
warrant caution. Although it is possible for a particular style of political
rhetoric to completely "drive out" others at some historical moment, "political discourse is typically polyglot," and political languages "do not typically
succeed in excluding one another."7 9 It is true that, if Rana were treating
settler freedom as static, and more or less coextensive with the republican
concept of freedom, he would have considerable historiographical support

74. See Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 387, 390 (2006) [hereinafter Wolfe, Elimination].
75. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
76. See Wolfe, Elimination, supra note 74, at 401; see also Patrick Wolfe, After the
Frontier: Separation and Absorption in US Indian Policy, I SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 13
(2011) (analyzing the evolving strategies the United States adopted for eliminating American
Indian populations, including geographic removal prior to the closing of the frontier and assimilation afterwards).
77.
78.
79.

Elkins & Pedersen, supra note 15, at 3.
Wolfe, Elimination,supra note 74, at 402.
J.G.A. POCOCK, The Concept of a Language and the Metier d'Historien: Some

Considerationson Practice, in THE LANGUAGES OF POLITICAL THEORY IN EARLY MODERN

EUROPE 19 (Anthony Pagden ed., 1987), reprinted in J.G.A. PococK, POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND HISTORY 87, 89 (2009).
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for his claim that the concept had essentially been extinguished from constitutional structure by the 1930s. 8"
However, while it may be a more responsible approach to intellectual
history to focus on the discontinuities between our contemporary idea of
freedom and the settler concept, it might have been better normative theory
to focus on how the settler concept evolved in ways that influence our current constitutional understanding. By treating settler freedom as an adaptive
concept, as Rana did in his analysis of the nineteenth century, one could
likely find some traces of the settler ideology in the constitutional politics of
the New Deal and beyond. For example, in Rana's account, the New Deal's
emphasis on "economic security" rather than true "economic independence"
was a paradigmatic shift away from a republican ideology. Other scholars,
however, have identified continuities between the egalitarianism of the republican tradition and the constitutional structure of the New Deal. William
Forbath, for example, argues that the New Deal ratified a vision of "social
citizenship" in which "the guarantee of equal citizenship entailed decent
work, a measure of economic autonomy and democracy, and social provision for 'all Americans.' "" While this social citizenship concept differs in
significant ways from classical republican freedom-it is compatible, for
example, with an economy based on wage labor 82-any exploration of how
it might intersect with Rana's framework is precluded by his static definition
of settler freedom.
In addition to allowing for such an inquiry, a fluid treatment of settler
freedom would have allowed exploration of how a settler framework might
explain New Deal political rhetoric that cannot easily be squared with a
mere commitment to economic security. For instance, what could the
framework tell us about Frances Perkins's claim that Roosevelt detested "the
dole" and wanted temporary unemployment relief programs designed so that
they would be "curtailed and cancelled as soon as there was a revival of
business and employment opportunities? 3 Or what might it say about initiatives such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, which its administrators
characterized as a "civic melting pot" in which young men "from varying
backgrounds... are taught the old-fashioned virtues of hard work[?]" 4
With regard to the principle of self-rule, a more flexible concept of settler
freedom might shed light on the ways in which the New Deal was arguably an
outgrowth of participatory constitutional politics and accommodated some
80. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; FONER, supra note 23, at 97-108 (describing the collapse of free labor ideology after the Civil War).
81.
(1999).

William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98

MICH.

L. REV. 1, 4

82. See id. at 70-71 (describing union leaders' and ordinary workers' roles in shaping
the New Deal conception of citizenship).
83.
84.

FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW

284 (1946); see id. at 285-301.

NEIL M. MAHER, NATURE'S NEW DEAL: THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS AND

THE ROOTS OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
IAN

CONSERVATION

CONSERVATION CORPS

CORPS,

ANNUAL

8 (1939)).

REPORT

OF

THE

108 (2009) (quoting U.S. CIVILDIRECTOR

OF
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CIVILIAN
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level of local decisionmaking. As William Forbath has argued, New Deal
officials, in talking in a language of economic and social rights, "tapped a
protest language millions of industrial workers encountered in the
groundswell of [Congress of Industrial Organizations ("CIO")] organizing. '85 Moreover, many New Deal accomplishments, including the
establishment of the right to collective bargaining and the creation of social
insurance programs, reflected the demands of activists and leaders of the
CIO, which "had become the organizational and financial mainstay of the
Democratic Party."86 These successes, according to Forbath, reflect not
simply the influence of union leaders but the mobilization of millions of
working-class families into the base of the New Deal Democratic Party.87
Finally, while the New Deal established an administrative bureaucracy under
the control of the president, many New Deal programs were locally administered and, notwithstanding their formal mandates, modified at the ground
level to reflect regional political structures. 8
I am not contending that these observations reflect a historically legitimate account of the New Deal, nor do I wish to enter the debate about
whether the New Deal was the product of a participatory constitutional politics or a commitment to economic autonomy. I want to suggest, however,
that there is at least a plausible interpretation of the New Deal Constitution
that is compatible with Rana's settler framework. Constructing such a narrative, even if it were a highly stylized one, might have better served Rana's
goal of presenting history "in the service of today's problems as well as tomorrow's latent possibilities" than insisting that his settler ideology plays no
role in modem constitutional politics (p. 17).
Consider, for example, the role of home ownership in American politics.
One of the values that Rana attributes to the settler ideology is a commitment to land ownership as a means of economic independence. It would be
interesting to explore how this value evolved through the twentieth century,
and whether our current political culture bears traces of this element of the
settler colonial framework. Scholars have documented, for example, how
corporate interests in the early twentieth century encouraged workers to
purchase mortgaged homes on the theory that debt-ridden homeowners
would be reluctant to go on strike.8 9 This rise in corporate enthusiasm for
85.
86.
87.

Forbath, supra note 81, at 70.
Id.
Id.

88.
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 109 (2004).
89. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN Los ANGELES 28 (Verso 2006) (1992) (describing a Los Angeles Merchants and Manufacturing

Association member's boast that in 1914 "working class home ownership was the keystone of
the Open Shop and a 'contented' labor force," and union leaders' characterization of mortgage
payments as " 'new serfdom' that made Los Angeles workers timid in the face of their bosses"); Anne E. Mosher, "Something Better than the Best": Industrial Restructuring, George
McMurtry and the Creationof the Model Industrial Town of Vandergrift,Pennsylvania, 18831901, 85 ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 84, 103-04 (1995) (describing how homeowning
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mortgages coincided with one of the first federal subsidies for home ownership: deductions for interest on mortgage payments (along with all other

"interest paid on. . . indebtedness") that were incorporated into the modem
federal income tax in 1913.90 Federal incentives toward individualized home
ownership deepened during the New Deal, when Congress set up the Federal Housing Administration to insure long-term mortgages and created the

Federal National Mortgage Association for the purpose of providing liquidity for those mortgages. 91
Taken together, these political choices have sustained a tremendous

effective

demand

for (tax-subsidized

and mortgage-financed)

home

ownership. As geographer David Harvey has argued, this economic
framework has transformed both the political and physical landscape of the
country, giving rise to suburbs where home ownership is widespread and "the
defence of individual housing value is a collective norm, upheld by
homeowership associations, even in the midst of plenty of isolated
individualism."9 2 Indeed, the American cultural norms that support home
ownership are now so strong that, according to Harvey, "[p]reliminary
studies of those caught up in the foreclosure wave now indicate ... that
many of them blame themselves rather than systemic conditions for not
being able, for whatever reason, to live up to the personal responsibility."93
To the extent that Rana's framework could help explain the origins and
contours of these norms, it could be relevant to some difficult and pressing
constitutional puzzles. It could, for example, shed light on the cultural
dimensions of descriptive questions like how best to understand the nature
of the political backlash to Kelo v. City of New London,94 as well as

normative ones like how to determine which rights should (or should not) be
guaranteed under a new, welfare-oriented constitutionalism.95

workers in a model town "expressed little interest in striking or organizing so long as they
held property or a mortgage on it").
90. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913); Nadav Shoked,
The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of ResidentialZoning and the Modern Populist
Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 93-94 & n.8 (2011).
91. Julie Andersen Hill, Bailouts and Credit Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the Farm
Credit System, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 1, 17, 19; see also Adam Gordon, Note, The Creation of
Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made
Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 193

(2005).
92.

DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL

150 (2010).

93. Id. at 132.
94. 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that a city did not violate the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause in exercising eminent domain for the purpose
of developing a distressed area); cf Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2101-02 (2009) ("The Kelo backlash probably

resulted in more new state legislation than any other Supreme Court decision in history.").
95. Cf Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 Tx. L. REV. 1, 87-88 (2009)
(suggesting that the 2008 financial crisis could revitalize a welfare-oriented constitutionalism,
and recommending that "home ownership" as one of the guarantees in President Roosevelt's
Second Bill of Rights be resurrected).
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These are, of course, speculations. Perhaps settler colonial theory and
contemporary constitutional law are too separate, and the connections between them too tenuous, for anything to be gained from this kind of inquiry.
But Rana's compelling account of the settler ideology's evolution through
the nineteenth century, and the theoretical potential of his decision to depart
from the norms of traditional historical scholarship, suggest it might have
been worth trying.

